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The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conf lict in the Republic 
of South Sudan provides quite ambitiously and laudably for the creation 
of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan under the auspices of the African 
Union. The article is an extract from the author’s 2016 LL.M. dissertation 
submitted to the University of Pretoria. It critically examines the salient 
features of the proposed court with the aim of testing the court’s ability 
to effectively address historical grievances and injustices in South Sudan. 
In so doing, the article draws lessons from similar mechanisms in Africa 
and beyond. It also interrogates the role of the African Union and South 
Sudan in operationalising this court. It reveals strengths as well as 
weaknesses in the proposed design of the court as well as in the ability 
of the African Union and South Sudan to fulfil their obligations. Despite 
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these weaknesses, the article argues that by harnessing the strengths 
identified and learning from lessons from across the continent, the African 
Union (AU) and South Sudan can overcome the anticipated challenges 
and operationalise a hybrid court which will effectively deliver sustainable 
justice to the victims of international crimes committed during the South 
Sudan civil war.
Keywords: South Sudan, African Union, Hybrid Court, international 
crimes, human rights, transitional justice
1. Introduction
After months of simmering political tensions, violence erupted in South 
Sudan on 15 December 2013 when President Salva Kiir attempted to arrest 
his former deputy Dr Riek Machar on allegations of an attempted coup 
d’état, an allegation that has since been discounted by the African Union 
Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS). The violence spread 
fast, resulting in international crimes being committed by forces loyal 
to Kiir and breakaway forces loyal to Machar (AUCISS 2014:1125–1137). 
Concerted efforts led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) and supported by the African Union (AU) and other stakeholders 
resulted in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conf lict in the Republic 
of South Sudan (ARCSS) on 17 August 2015 (Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development [IGAD] 2015).
The ARCSS provides for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South 
Sudan (HCSS), as one among other transitional justice mechanisms, and 
envisions a major role for the AU in its establishment and operationalisation. 
This proposal buys into the liberal-prosecution model of transitional 
justice which emphasises the prosecution of the planners and organisers of 
international crimes. This article interrogates the capability of the HCSS 
to deliver sustainable transitional justice solutions to South Sudan and 
explores how the AU can contribute to its success. The article is primarily 
a qualitative desk-based research with primary data gathered from relevant 
instruments and policy documents and statutes and jurisprudence of 
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similar mechanisms. Secondary data from textbooks, journal articles, 
newspapers, commentaries and electronic sources are also relied on, with 
limited discussion interviews being used only to supplement the primary 
and secondary sources. Section one provides an introduction, methodology 
and outlay of the article. Section two lays a foundation for discussion of the 
current conf lict by providing a historical context. Section three assesses 
the potential of the proposed HCSS to learn from the failures of South 
Sudan’s past f lirtations with transitional justice and deliver sustainable 
solutions. Section four explores the potential of the AU to contribute to the 
success of the HCSS.
2. Historical context of the South Sudan crisis
After over five decades of armed resistance by the people of Southern 
Sudan against marginalisation and oppression by the government of Sudan 
(Garang 1992; Kebbede 1997; Deng 2005; Machar 1995), the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of the Republic of the 
Sudan. Consequently, Southern Sudan gained autonomy on 9 July 2005 
under Dr John Garang as president of Southern Sudan region and First 
Vice-President of Sudan. However, Garang died in a helicopter crash on 
30 July 2005 and was succeeded by his deputy Kiir with Machar as the 
new deputy. The pair led the South to independence as the Republic of 
South Sudan on 9 July 2011 following a referendum in line with the CPA. 
While the CPA symbolised the beginning of the South’s long-overdue 
journey to democratic and economic prosperity (Natsios 2005:89), the new 
state’s success depended a lot on how it addressed human rights violations 
committed during the conf lict. Eleven years into the CPA, however, the 
anticipated ‘peace dividends’ have not materialised and a civil war rages. 
The South Sudan crisis is complex and multidimensional and an exhaustive 
discussion is beyond the scope of this article. This section, however, 
explores some of the factors involved in as far as they have a bearing on 
the discussion of transitional justice, particularly criminal accountability.
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2.1 South-South violations of human rights during the Sudan 
civil war
While the Sudan civil war mainly pitted the South against Khartoum, the 
Southerners had unresolved internal issues. Significantly, the split in 1991 
within the SPLM/A (then known only as Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army 
[SPLA]) was a defining moment in intra-South relations. Machar, Lam Akol 
and others rebelled from the SPLA at Nasir in what came to be known as 
the Nasir rebellion (Akol 2003). The disagreement was initially a tussle 
between unitary ideologues who advocated for equality for Southerners but 
as part of Sudan, and separatist ideologues who advocated for complete 
independence of the South from Sudan (Malwal 2015:157; Garang 1992). 
However, the antagonists soon intensified ethnic passions along the lines of 
Machar’s Nuer ethnic group and Garang’s Dinka group (The Sudd Institute 
2014:2). The splinter group gruesomely killed Dinka combatants within 
their ranks before massacring the Dinka civilian populations in Twic East 
and Bor (Malwal 2015:159–160, 205; Crawford-Browne 2006:54; Johnson 
2016:6). Deadly confrontations between the SPLA and the splinter group 
continued for the greater part of the 1990s and Machar eventually aligned 
with Khartoum in 1997. Even though temporary peace, at least enough 
to allow refocus towards the common enemy in Khartoum, was achieved 
after the much-hailed Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation 
Conference in Wunlit (AUCISS 2014:922–951; Ashworth et al. 2014:151–167), 
this fateful event sowed deep distrust among Southern communities as 
Machar’s actions were considered a Nuer betrayal of the Southern cause.
Other conf licts before and after the events of 1991 equally resulted in 
destructive violence. These include the disagreements in the 1970s and 
early 1980s when the then rebel group known as Anyanya was transitioning 
from the First Civil War to the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and 
to the beginning of the Second Civil War in 1983 (Malwal 2015), as well 
as later factional clashes in several areas in the South (Human Rights 
Watch/Africa 1994:19–21; AUCISS 2014:855–856). These too were ignored 
in the lead-up to the CPA with Garang championing a united Southern 
front and inviting Machar back to the SPLM in 2002 as it became clear 
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that the peace process had potential for success (Crawford-Browne 
2006:54). Unease and suspicion simmered within SPLM ranks especially 
after Garang’s death and elections in 2010 (The Sudd Institute 2014:3–4). 
The affected communities did not receive recompense or a genuine apology 
for the atrocities committed against them during these unfortunate events 
(Malwal 2015:160; Johnson 2016:151–152). 
Some Southerners were also caught in the cross-fire between the SPLA and 
the Sudanese army. Garrison towns under Sudanese army occupation, such 
as Malakal, Juba, Wau and Yei were frequently attacked by the SPLM and 
casualties often included the civilian residents who the SPLM considered as 
either loyal to or sympathetic to Khartoum (Crawford-Browne 2006:68). 
When the CPA was signed, these towns and their peoples became part of the 
South with no mention made of redress for the atrocities committed against 
them. SPLM and other Southerners who actively fought against Khartoum 
continued to treat them with suspicion (Zahar 2011:37) and perhaps even 
contempt. The unaddressed events and old rivalries highlighted above 
created room for resentment and distrust in the new state and within the 
SPLM government.
2.2 Criminal accountability under the CPA and the question of 
state succession
Justice and accountability were not exactly a priority in the CPA process 
(Basha 2006:28). While it did not expressly provide for amnesty, the CPA was 
unnervingly silent on the question of accountability for abuses committed 
during the Sudan civil war. This, Ibrahim (2007:491–492) concludes, was a 
deliberate de facto amnesty intended to ensure continued political goodwill 
for the CPA. This article, however, asserts that the government of national 
unity comprising the SPLM and the Khartoum-based National Congress Party 
(NCP) which governed Sudan during the interim period from 2005 to 2011 was 
bound under international human rights law to provide effective remedy for 
human rights violations committed during the war since Sudan was a party to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  
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However, the question of state succession arises in relation to human rights 
treaty obligations of the new Republic of South Sudan after independence 
in 2011. Article 16 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties appears to endorse the ‘clean slate’ approach excusing 
newly-independent states from their predecessors’ treaty obligations. 
However, this article argues for automatic state succession to human rights 
treaties since they codify general principles of inherent human dignity and 
seek to avoid a gap in protection which would expose previously protected 
populations to potential violations (Weeramantry 1996:645–655). The UN 
Human Rights Committee later adopted this position in General Comment 
26 on continuity of obligations, particularly for ICCPR rights. Therefore, 
despite South Sudan not having formally acceded to ICCPR, it was obligated 
to provide effective remedy for the human rights abuses as it automatically 
assumed ICCPR obligations of Sudan upon its independence. Further, 
as a member of the UN it is bound by the Charter of the United Nations 
to act towards the UN’s common purpose of promoting and respecting 
human rights. The silence of the CPA could not reasonably be interpreted 
as absolving the government of South Sudan of its obligations under 
international law.
2.3 South Sudan’s approach to transitional justice after the 
Sudan civil war
The preceding sections have highlighted the fact that the new nation 
desperately required genuine accountability and reconciliation to provide 
closure and draw clear lines on impunity. However, the government of 
South Sudan failed to prioritise and initiate such processes. Instead, 
former fighters and militias were unconditionally integrated into the SPLA 
and the society regardless of their previous misdeeds against civilians 
(Zahar 2011:37).
Granted, the government launched the Presidential Committee for 
Community Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei State in 2012 
(Ashworth 2015:177) as this was the area hit hardest by inter-ethnic conflicts. 
This committee’s recommendations are, however, yet to be implemented 
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(AUCISS 2014:920). Attempts by Machar’s wife, Angelina Teny, to launch 
a healing and reconciliation initiative also failed as it was not government-
driven, but rather a Machar family project widely suspected as political 
scheming (AUCISS 2014:914–915). Discomfort over Machar’s role in the 
events of 1991 that left some of the deepest scars in South Sudanese society 
could also have been a factor. Further, the first nationwide government 
initiative, National Reconciliation Committee for Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation, created in 2013, was also unable to fully commence operations 
since the war broke out shortly after its creation (AUCISS 2014:920). 
2.4 Exclusionary governance and poor development record
The South Sudanese people expected their new government to forge a 
national identity through an inclusive and cohesive development agenda 
(Jok 2011). Marginalisation was, after all, one of the main reasons why the 
people of the South so resiliently fought Khartoum for years. Ironically 
therefore, Khartoum’s exploitative style served to set a high bar for the new 
government with statehood igniting hopes of better governance. However, 
the SPLM government seems to have done the opposite. The foundations 
for this lie in the design of the CPA.
Apart from its signatories, the CPA was largely negotiated without 
reasonable involvement of other Sudanese stakeholders (Ibrahim 2007:475) 
thereby failing to provide sufficient guarantees and safeguards for minority 
inclusion. Further, the CPA handed over near-total control of the South to 
SPLM by giving it 70% representation in the interim Southern parliament 
with only 15% each left for other Southern stakeholders and the NCP. This 
imbalance enabled the SPLM to dominate the Southern parliament well 
into independence. South Sudan comprises over 60 diverse ethnic groups 
with the Dinka and Nuer being the majority. However, far from the facile 
and Afro-pessimistic conclusion of commentators like Silva (2014:78–80), 
ethnic diversity is not in itself the cause of South Sudan’s problems. 
The concern rather is that power in the SPLM was not diversified among 
the various interest groups, but was instead concentrated around an elite 
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group (Jok 2011) leading to marginalisation, exclusion, unequal treatment 
and discontent within large sections of society (Zahar 2011:37). 
This exclusion enabled corruption and mismanagement to thrive in 
government, leading to weak national institutions and eventually crippling 
provision of basic services. This was compounded by the fact that the 
new nation had almost non-existent structures and very few qualified 
civil servants to take up the responsibility of policy development and 
implementation. These factors heightened public frustration which only 
required a political trigger that came in the form of the events of 15 
December 2013 and quickly spiralled into a civil war. 
2.5 National security as a challenge to peace and transitional justice
Despite the SPLM being quite organised in its struggle against Khartoum, 
it was in fact a ‘coalition’ of armed factions and ideologues (Deng 2005) 
over who the SPLM leadership did not always have total control. Further, 
the CPA required the SPLM to transform into a professional political 
movement and military force despite most SPLA fighters and commanders 
being once-regular country-folk hardened by years of bush war and who 
had probably grown accustomed to operating more as rebels than as 
professional soldiers or civilians (Guarak 2011:555). However, the much-
needed security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration, was not effectively undertaken. Many ordinary civilians 
had also acquired undocumented firearms for civil defence which they 
were reluctant to surrender for a future that seemed uncertain at the time 
(Crawford-Browne 2006:61). South Sudan was therefore ushered into 
statehood with many undocumented weapons in the hands of civilians and 
militias and a ‘military’ that was more militia than national army.
The SPLA added to its military woes by massively recruiting over 7 500 new 
soldiers, inevitably from a population comprising many people who had 
had very little access to education (AUCISS 2014:53–54). While this in itself 
may not have been a problem, the process was skewed to favour those from 
groups loyal to Kiir, and to a small extent Machar. Further, the process 
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of recruitment, training and deployment was opaque and allowed for most 
recruits to operate outside of official military channels (AUCISS 2014:53–
54). A combination of these factors contributed greatly in compromising 
peace and security in South Sudan.
3. Criminal accountability under the ARCSS
As discussed in the preceding section, South Sudan failed to engage in a 
much-needed genuine transitional justice process for events during the 
Sudan civil war. This set the stage for a political conf lict to very quickly 
spiral into a full-blown civil war from 15 December 2013 – characterised 
by massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law amounting to international crimes. The ARCSS of 17 August 2015 
unequivocally acknowledges the disharmony resulting from past human 
rights abuses and the need for accountability, and then provides for the 
establishment of the HCSS. This seems to adopt the recommendation of 
the AUCISS that accountability must be pursued as part of a wider process 
of societal reconciliation if sustainable peace is to be achieved in South 
Sudan. 
While individual criminal responsibility as a transitional justice mechanism 
is now well-established – dating back to the post-World War I aborted 
attempt to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and the shambolic 
Ottoman trials, and its successful affirmation at the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremburg in 1946 – criminal prosecutions in circumstances 
of mass violations are, according to Schabas (2002), generally time and 
resource intensive such that not all perpetrators can be prosecuted. It is 
for this reason that the International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, 
concentrates on individuals considered to bear the greatest responsibility 
for international crimes. Further, criminal accountability cannot single-
handedly ensure genuine transitional justice, but rather reconciliation 
and justice are both necessary as experiences from Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone have shown (Sooka et al. 2016). The ARCSS confronts these realities 
by providing for a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing 
(CTRH) and a Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA) to operate 
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simultaneously with the court. This article, however, only focuses on the 
HCSS by analysing and testing it against prevailing standards of transitional 
justice and human rights.
3.1 Establishment of the HCSS
The UN defines a hybrid court as one whose jurisdiction and composition 
is mixed, exhibits international and national aspects and is often located 
within the territory of the crime (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] 2008:1). As will be discussed 
below, the HCSS is indeed a hybrid court within this definition. The choice 
of a hybrid court as opposed to an international tribunal is ideal where 
national systems are either non-existent or incapable of addressing mass 
violations and where a purely internationalised mechanism would not 
earn local acceptance (Kaleck 2015:55; OHCHR 2008:3–4). South Sudan 
presents such a scenario; hence the proposed HCSS as a court superior to, 
and independent of, the South Sudan judiciary.
According to the ARCSS, the African Union Commission (AUC) is 
responsible for the establishment of the HCSS and in this regard, is required 
to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government to 
operationalise the court. The AUC has the mandate of determining key 
aspects of the court such as location, funding, infrastructure, enforcement 
and personnel. This design gives the AU a role as prominent as, if not 
more prominent than, that of the government of South Sudan in relation 
to the HCSS. While this can potentially promote resistance and non-
cooperation from domestic authorities (Bell 2000:273), it is necessary 
where domestic mechanisms are incapable of conducting genuine 
investigations and prosecutions for reasons of incapacity or susceptibility 
to political manipulation. The AUC has since prepared and submitted a 
draft statute to the transitional government of South Sudan, which statute 
has been approved by the Council of Ministers (CoM) and is currently 
awaiting parliamentary approval (Commission on Human Rights in South 
Sudan 2017:115).
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Despite the above powers given to the AUC by the ARCSS, the ARCSS 
also empowers the government through the general powers of the CoM 
to initiate the legislation operationalising transitional justice mechanisms, 
including the HCSS. Parliament is then expected to enact this legislation 
by consensus or a two-thirds majority vote as a last resort, in an attempt 
to promote consensus and local ownership. The power bestowed upon the 
CoM in this regard is quite immense considering that the CoM was an 
uncomfortable compromise between warring parties (Johnson 2016:294), 
at least until Machar’s departure in July 2016 and the outbreak of renewed 
violence. As such there is the likelihood of deadlock in decision making 
at the CoM either due to factional differences, or outright lack of good 
faith due to the possibility that some members of the CoM are themselves 
likely to be subjected to the HCSS (Tiitmamer 2016:14). Expecting political 
goodwill on fundamental decisions on transitional justice from these 
individuals may be stretching the limits of expectation. 
Further to the above conf lation of responsibilities, the ARCSS gives the 
National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) the general 
mandate of drafting new legislation required under the Agreement. The NCAC 
is an eight-member committee comprising representatives from government, 
Machar’s breakaway SPLM/A-In Opposition, former political detainees, 
other political parties and IGAD. Overall, the above powers raise the 
potential for conf lict of responsibilities between the AUC, the responsible 
ministry, the CoM and the NCAC thereby creating confusion as to who 
exactly between the AUC and the government (and within the government) 
is responsible for the creation of the court. The anticipated MoU between 
the AU and the government should either expressly oust the jurisdiction of 
one of the above organs over the HCSS legislation or clearly lay out how this 
responsibility is to be shared.
3.2 Jurisdiction of the HCSS
The HCSS has broad temporal jurisdiction over international crimes 
committed from 15 December 2013 to the end of the 30-month transition 
period. In hindsight, there was much wisdom in extending this jurisdiction 
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to beyond the signing of the Agreement, especially considering that more 
violations have since occurred after the formation of the transitional 
government when Kiir and Machar fell out once again. However, the periodic 
limitation of jurisdiction precludes the court from addressing widespread 
atrocities committed before 15 December 2013 particularly in Jonglei state 
where well-organised inter-communal violence was prevalent before and 
after independence (Johnson 2016). Some commentators, however, believe 
that this was a necessary political decision in order to avoid constraining 
the resources of the court and to also give domestic criminal courts the 
opportunity to complement the HCSS (Musila Interview 2016b). To cure 
the above temporal gap in the court’s mandate and to ensure that persons 
not prosecuted by the HCSS face domestic processes, the government needs 
to occasion legislative measures necessary to empower domestic courts to 
try international crimes in a manner complementary to and respectful of 
the supremacy of the HCSS.
The court’s subject matter jurisdiction encompasses genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, sexual crimes, gender-based crimes and other 
serious crimes under both international law and South Sudanese law. This 
expansive jurisdiction is designed to ensure that all possible serious crimes 
committed during this period are prosecuted. However, in relation to South 
Sudanese law the ARCSS (IGAD 2015: chap V, 3.1.1) simply says ‘and/or 
applicable South Sudanese law’ without elaborating the specific laws, be 
they substantive, procedural or evidentiary. The applicable domestic law 
should be clarified beforehand, preferably by the anticipated statute, in 
order to eliminate the possibility of applying laws that may be inconsistent 
with international standards (OHCHR 2008:12).
Notably, the HCSS has a wide personal jurisdiction over any individual 
allegedly responsible for international crimes in this context, regardless 
of nationality. This is necessary considering the complexity of the conf lict 
which raises the possibility of non-nationals also having been involved. 
Such wide personal jurisdiction was instrumental for the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) which exercised its jurisdiction in Prosecutor v Charles 
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Ghankay Taylor and prosecuted and convicted Taylor in 2012 for his role in 
the conf lict in Sierra Leone despite him being a Liberian national.
Significantly, the ARCSS also advocates for restorative justice. The court is 
empowered to order forfeiture of property or proceeds of crime to the state 
or restoration to the rightful owners. This is in addition to the court’s power 
to order reparations. These powers are designed to ensure that beyond 
punitive justice, victims get some measure of tangible compensation for 
the crimes against them. 
Related to jurisdiction is the court’s mandate to leave a ‘permanent 
legacy’ in South Sudan, consistent with the position of the UN that the 
establishment of a hybrid court must consider what legacy it will leave in the 
country (United Nations 2004:46). Legacy in this context is the enduring 
impact the court has on improving the rule of law in the country (OHCHR 
2008:4). South Sudan ranks very low on the Rule of Law – being ranked 
by the 2018 Freedom House Index among the worst of the worst at 2/100 
(Freedom House 2018) – and as such, the HCSS is expected to set a lasting 
example for domestic institutions on accountability and the rule of law. 
However, the ARCSS is silent on who should have custody of the archival 
records of the HCSS. While the records are crucial for an impactful legacy 
and in creating a historical record, the need to protect some witnesses and 
victims is equally compelling (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). Custody has become 
a controversial issue between the UN and Rwanda over the archives of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The UN took custody 
of the archives after the ICTR wound up in 2015, but Rwanda continues to 
demand custody as it deems these to be crucial for its national memory of 
the 1994 genocide (United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals 2015). To avoid a similar situation in future between South 
Sudan and the AU, the anticipated MoU and statute establishing the HCSS 
should clarify who has the responsibility of keeping the HCSS’s archival 
records upon its winding up.
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3.3 Membership and staff of the HCSS
The Agreement seeks impartiality and contextual sensitivity by providing 
for majority foreign judges from other African nations and minority South 
Sudanese judges. All prosecutors, the registrar and other staff, on the other 
hand, shall be foreign nationals from other African states. The ARCSS 
seems to have adopted a UN recommendation that hybrid courts for 
divided societies such as South Sudan should ideally be comprised of a 
majority of international judges in order to guarantee fairness, impartiality 
and objectivity (United Nations 2004:64). While the South Sudan judges 
bring deep understanding of the specific cultural and historical context, 
the other non-national African judges bring a general understanding of 
the African context and valuable experience. This composition guarantees 
local ownership, both by South Sudan specifically and Africa in general; 
ensures contextual sensitivity; and guarantees impartiality, fairness, 
efficiency and professionalism in accordance with established principles of 
international criminal justice.
However, the exclusion of South Sudan nationals from the prosecution team 
is worrying. A mix of majority non-nationals and minority nationals would 
have been ideal to further promote South Sudan ownership of the process, 
infuse contextual familiarity in the team while maintaining impartiality 
and objectivity, and promote capacity building of South Sudanese 
professionals (Musila Interview 2016b). The Central African Republic’s 
proposed Cour Pénal Spécial is instructive in this regard as it provides for 
an international prosecutor deputised by a national and assisted by a team 
of prosecutors comprising majority non-nationals and minority nationals 
(Musila 2016a:23). This provision ought to be reconsidered when drafting 
the anticipated statute of the HCSS to allow for a South Sudanese national 
to deputise the non-national chief prosecutor as well as have a reasonable 
number of South Sudanese prosecutors, investigators and assisting staff.
A poorly worded provision of the ARCSS (IGAD 2015: chap V, 3.3.3) 
further purports to restrict the right of accused persons to defence counsel 
of their choice by providing that, ‘… [duty] defence counsels of the HCSS 
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shall be composed of personnel from African states other than the Republic 
of South Sudan ...’ (emphasis added). It is a recognised international human 
rights principle that an accused person should not be denied the right to 
choose counsel of his or her choice. Purporting to preclude South Sudanese 
nationals from acting as duty defence counsels potentially violates this 
right (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). Similar concerns arose concerning the 
fairness of the decision of the Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires au 
Sénégal in Ministère Public v Hissèin Habré to appoint Senegalese lawyers 
for Habré, a former president of Chad, without his approval after he 
refused to cooperate with the court (Oyugi 2016). Best practice from the 
ICC, and other criminal courts/tribunals, requires the court to give the 
accused persons an opportunity to pick from a list of available counsels 
of any nationality where the court has to assign defence counsel, thereby 
ensuring the above right is upheld. The anticipated statute should clarify 
this position to expressly allow South Sudanese nationals to be listed as 
duty defence counsels.
Another concern is on the appointment of support staff for prosecutors and 
the defence. While the ARCSS is express on the AU being the appointing 
authority of judges, prosecutors, duty defence counsels and the registrar, 
it is silent on who should appoint the other staff and investigators. This 
potentially leaves room for the government to take the lead on these 
appointments and this could be exploited to compromise the court processes 
and jeopardise security of witnesses (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). The MoU and 
anticipated legislation should expressly make the AU responsible for these 
appointments.
3.4 The HCSS and the question of immunity
The ARCSS expressly precludes the possibility of immunity or amnesty 
from criminal responsibility. Non-immunity is long established in 
international criminal law judging by the constitutive instruments of past 
and current international criminal mechanisms. A recent UNDP survey 
also reveals significant support by South Sudanese for non-immunity as 
they attribute the intransigence of some of their leaders to the 2005 CPA’s 
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de facto immunities (UNDP 2015:23). Notably the Agreement departs from 
the AU’s apparent position on immunities as evidenced by the June 2014 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights which seeks to add an international 
criminal chamber to the proposed court, but which expressly provides 
personal immunity from prosecution for heads of state and government 
and senior government officials. It is therefore laudable that slightly over 
a year after the protocol’s adoption, an AU-backed mechanism expressly 
precludes any immunities. This either indicates a change of tune by the AU 
on the issue of immunity or at the very least signifies hope for such change. 
The ARCSS further remarkably provides that persons indicted or convicted 
by the court are ineligible to participate in government for a period to 
be determined and further that any indicted person eventually ‘proven 
innocent’ will be entitled to compensation (IGAD 2015: chap V, 5). The first 
part of this provision is a legitimate endeavour aimed at giving the nation 
a chance to move forward under trustworthy and untainted leadership. 
However, two issues need to be clarified in this regard. First, it should 
be clarified whether this lustration takes effect upon indictment or upon 
conviction. The presumption of innocence principle swings in favour of 
this lustration taking effect upon conviction. Secondly, it would be prudent 
to clarify whether this period of exclusion will run concurrently with or 
subsequent to the sentence. Ideally, this period should run subsequent to 
serving sentence for it to have any meaningful effect. The exclusion will 
also inevitably require major shake-up of government which Tiitmamer 
(2016) argues is potentially destabilising. However, this article asserts that 
the exercise is necessary to purge the government of persons responsible 
for heinous crimes against the people. The second part of the provision is 
a misnomer, which is most likely the result of inattentive drafting, since 
criminal courts do not pronounce on the innocence of accused persons, 
but rather on whether a case has been proved to the required standard 
of proof. 
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3.5 The legal relationship between the HCSS and the CTRH 
The Agreement is rather vague on the legal relationship between the HCSS 
and the CTRH, a fact that potentially exposes the two mechanisms to an 
antagonistic relationship. Both mechanisms have concurrent jurisdiction 
over violations committed between 15 December 2013 and 17 August 2015. 
This in itself is not a problem since the CTRH is a political institution 
offering political solutions while the HCSS is a judicial institution offering 
legal solutions in accordance with international criminal law. In fact, 
experiences from Peru, Argentina and Timor-Leste have shown that with 
a well-defined framework, the two mechanisms can beneficially and 
complementarily work together (United Nations 2004:26).
The experience of Sierra Leone, however, shows the risks of not clarifying 
a framework for interaction from the onset (Murungu 2011:104–106). 
In 2003, the SCSL trial chamber asserted in Prosecutor v Samuel Hinga 
Norman and Prosecutor v Augustine Gbao that to allow persons charged 
before the court to testify before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Sierra Leone would undermine the court’s autonomy and jeopardise 
the accused’s right to presumption of innocence. The appeals chamber 
disagreed, holding that the existence of the two mechanisms was based on 
the principles of complementarity and harmonious and practical balance 
between criminal prosecution and the need for truth and reconciliation, 
and that as such the accused persons could testify before the commission 
as long as the procedure for taking testimony upholds the integrity of 
the court process. While the SCSL appeals chamber’s decision is the 
appropriate position, this may not always be obvious, especially if the 
enabling instrument does not clearly spell out this relationship as is the 
case with the ARCSS. It is therefore important that the anticipated statute 
clarifies this relationship. 
4. The African Union and transitional justice in South Sudan
The previous section discussed salient features of the HCSS and identified 
strengths which should be maximised and shortcomings which should be 
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addressed by the AU and the government as the two stakeholders with the 
greatest responsibilities in this regard. While the primary responsibility of 
forging a path to sustainable peace in South Sudan rests with its people, the 
AU has a legal, political and ‘moral’ obligation to complement the process 
(Sooka et al. 2016). The government of South Sudan being a negotiated 
power-sharing arrangement as opposed to a democratically elected 
government, it may be prudent to provide for some degree of external 
pressure and oversight in order to ensure that the government fulfils its 
obligations regarding the HCSS. This appreciation probably informed the 
prominent role bestowed by the Agreement upon the AU in relation to the 
HCSS. How the AU responds to these obligations could determine to a 
great extent the future of the HCSS. This section therefore examines how 
the AU, being the regional political organisation, and its various relevant 
organs can effectively perform this role.
4.2 The legal basis for the African Union’s transitional  
justice mandate
The fundamental objectives of the AU as entrenched in the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union include a people-centric approach to the promotion 
of human rights, peace, security and stability in Africa. The AU seeks 
to achieve these objectives through peace-building, reconstruction and 
restoration of the rule of law in post-conf lict states and conf lict resolution 
mechanisms at domestic and continental levels. This is recognition of the 
fact that peace and security are only achievable if governance structures of 
individual countries and of the AU are effective, stable and responsive to 
the people’s needs. As such, the security of individual African countries is 
both a domestic as well as a continental concern.
4.2 The African Union’s continental transitional justice efforts
While the AU has in the past had little success in conf lict resolution in 
Africa, it has recently stepped up its efforts. It adopted the Policy on Post-
Conf lict Reconstruction and Development in 2006, which emphasised the 
need for countries emerging from conf lict to institute transitional justice 
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processes in order to address past and current grievances. While this 
policy affirmed the AU’s resolve to address impunity, it merely stated these 
principles without providing much in the form of a structural roadmap for 
their actualisation. 
Bold movement towards direct AU involvement in post-conf lict processes 
was heralded by the 2009 report of the African Union High-Level Panel 
on Darfur which recommended the establishment of a hybrid court for 
Darfur, truth and reconciliation mechanisms, and an AU implementation 
and monitoring panel. While most of the recommendations of this report 
have not been implemented, it provided the first clear indication of the 
AU’s practical role in transitional justice in member states. 
Taking cue from the above report, the AU Panel of the Wise (PoW) 
attempted to codify a continental policy on transitional justice. The panel’s 
report, entitled ‘Peace, justice and reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities 
and challenges in the fight against impunity’, revealed that domestic 
approaches by individual countries have largely been haphazard. The report 
recommended that the AU takes a more active and direct role in transitional 
justice in Africa by consolidating lessons from across the continent and 
developing common principles and concepts to enable it to effectively balance 
peace and security with accountability and reconciliation (African Union 
Panel of the Wise 2013:65–66). The panel attached to the report a draft 
it called the African Union Draft Transitional Justice Policy Framework 
(Draft Policy).
The draft was presented to the AU’s Specialised Technical Committee 
on Justice and Legal Affairs in November 2015, but the committee raised 
concerns that it was not comprehensively ref lective of the input of 
governments (Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the African Union and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2016). The committee 
then engaged experts from member states to re-draft the document. This 
article argues that South Sudan presents an opportunity for the AU to test 
the Draft Policy including subsequent expert consultations on the draft 
in order to strengthen it for adoption as a benchmark for continental 
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transitional justice standards. This will afford the AU the opportunity to 
develop a responsive and practical policy borne out of wide consultations, 
experience from ad hoc domestic mechanisms and the AU’s own experience 
in South Sudan.
Another complementary process was launched in 2013 by another AU 
organ, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 
which by a 2013 resolution on transitional justice in Africa commissioned 
a study to, among others, identify the specific role the ACHPR should play 
in supporting transitional justice mechanisms in Africa, possibly by means 
of a thematic special mechanism. The report of this study is due in May 
2018. Significantly, the government of South Sudan is expressly obliged 
by the Agreement to seek the ACHPR’s assistance in implementing the 
transitional justice mechanisms. The ACHPR’s work and experience thus 
far in this regard will be useful to the South Sudanese efforts while also 
affording the ACHPR the opportunity to develop and enrich its report with 
practical experience.
This article therefore argues that first the AU’s expert drafters and the 
ACHPR should harmonise their efforts in developing a continental 
transitional justice policy and then coordinate and direct these harmonised 
efforts towards facilitating the transitional justice process in South Sudan 
through sharing experiences, promoting capacity building and enriching 
the policy drafting effort. By harmonising inter-agency cooperation with 
the South Sudan process, the AU will ensure proper coordination, and 
hence efficiency, of its interventions. Further, this will ensure effective 
monitoring by the AU of the South Sudan process in order to f lag potential 
challenges and mobilise response.
4.3 The African Union and South Sudan before the Agreement
On 17 December 2013, two days after the civil war began, the AU expressed 
readiness to assist South Sudan find a peaceful solution, and soon thereafter 
directed the AUC Chairperson to consult the ACHPR and immediately 
establish a commission to investigate human rights and humanitarian law 
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violations in South Sudan during the war and make recommendations on 
accountability, reconciliation and healing. Significantly, this was the first 
time the AU acted so expeditiously to investigate human rights violations 
in a member state, and that while South Sudan was not at the time a state 
party to the African Charter which establishes the ACHPR.
The AUC Chairperson constituted the AUCISS comprising five eminent 
Africans – former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, Honourable 
Sophia Akuffo of Ghana, Ms Bineta Diop of Senegal, Prof Mahmood 
Mamdani of Uganda and Prof Pacifique Manirakiza of Burundi – in March 
2014 after consulting stakeholders including the warring parties, ostensibly 
to promote acceptance by all parties and dispel any perceptions of bias 
and impartiality. Its temporal mandate was capped at the date the civil 
war began, 15 December 2013. The AUCISS presented its final report to 
the AU on 15 October 2014, but the AU only released it a year later on 
27 October 2015. The report revealed widespread and systematic violations 
of human rights law and international humanitarian law amounting to 
international crimes, and recommended accountability, as well as healing 
and reconciliation processes. Having initiated and supported AUCISS, it is 
imperative that the AU follows up on its recommendations above in order 
to send a clear message against impunity and to affirm respect for its own 
processes (Sooka et al. 2016).
The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC), another AU organ, whose mandate is to protect and promote 
children’s rights and welfare in Africa, undertook a fact-finding mission to 
South Sudan in 2014 with the permission of the government and revealed 
grave violations of the rights of children during the civil war. Despite 
South Sudan not being a state party to the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child, the ACERWC interpreted its mandate broadly 
to allow it to conduct the mission. The ACERWC, like the AUCISS, drew 
attention to the need for accountability (African Committee of Experts on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child 2014:37). This contextual experience 
of the ACERWC coupled with its thematic expertise can collaboratively 
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be harnessed in order to ensure that the welfare of children prominently 
features in the South Sudan transitional justice process.
4.4 The transitional justice role of the African Union under 
the Agreement
The ARCSS envisions a very prominent role for the AU in operationalising 
the HCSS and obliges the government to work with the AU towards this 
end. As discussed in section three above, the ARCSS is ambiguous on 
who exactly should initiate the drafting of the court’s enabling statute. 
Nonetheless, the ARCSS expressly obliges the AU to establish the HCSS 
through an MoU with the government, and as mentioned above, the AUC 
Commission has already assumed a leading role and drafted a statute and 
submitted it to the government of South Sudan. Experts estimate that if the 
AU keeps up this pace, the court should be operational within three years 
(Musila Interview 2016b), which period this article argues is necessary to 
allow for a properly thought-out court structure and operational design. 
However, should the government unnecessarily delay the process, the AU 
should bypass it and establish the HCSS by invoking its powers under article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU which mandates it to intervene in a 
member state in the event of international crimes.
The AU is required to appoint personnel of the court as well as determine 
the location of the court, its infrastructure, its funding and enforcement 
of its decisions. These responsibilities require the AU to mobilise the 
necessary financial resources preferably by developing a fundraising 
outreach framework for the HCSS (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). While targeting 
global and regional donors, the focus should be on mobilising funds from 
AU member states as a primary component, either through compulsory 
member state contributions or as a vote-head in the AU annual budget. 
This way, funding sustainability can be assured and the AU will maintain 
the HCSS’ identity as an Africa-owned and Africa-led and, for the most 
part, Africa-resourced initiative.
In deciding the court’s location, a balance should be struck between security 
of court personnel and witnesses and the court’s accessibility to the South 
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Sudanese people (Nyagoah e-mail 2016). Arguably therefore, it cannot be 
located in South Sudan due to prevailing insecurity. This article argues 
that Arusha, Tanzania would be ideal with the possibility of relocation to 
South Sudan if and when security conditions improve. Arusha is reasonably 
geographically close to South Sudan and has the infrastructural advantage 
having inherited the facilities of the ICTR that wound up its activities 
in 2015. Further, Tanzania is politically stable and offers security unlike 
South Sudan’s immediate neighbours Sudan, Central African Republic and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tanzania is also relatively politically 
neutral and impartial unlike Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia who besides 
hosting large South Sudanese refugee populations, have also been accused 
of providing a safe haven for resources plundered from South Sudan during 
the conf lict (The Sentry 2016).
Also relevant to the success of the HCSS is the AU’s consolidation of the 
political support of its members and other stakeholders. To avoid the pitfall 
of lack of political goodwill and cooperation that characterised the ICC’s 
relationship with Sudan and Kenya leading to the hibernation of Prosecutor 
v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, withdrawal of charges in Prosecutor v 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and vacation of charges in Prosecutor v William 
Samoei Ruto & Joshua arap Sang, the AU must mobilise its members to 
unequivocally support the HCSS and collectively put pressure on South 
Sudan to cooperate with the HCSS. After securing this support, the AU 
should then embark on galvanising global support for the HCSS. However, 
the AU should not in the process shirk its responsibilities by delegating 
to global stakeholders. Rather, it should provide the necessary leadership 
in coordinating external support to achieve cohesiveness and efficiency 
(Sooka et al. 2016). This way the transitional justice process in South 
Sudan will not be dominated by donor interests, but will be Africa-driven 
with complementary assistance from global stakeholders. 
5. Conclusion
This article sought to examine the capability of the proposed HCSS to 
deliver sustainable transitional justice solutions to South Sudan, and 
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ways in which the AU can effectively contribute to its success. The article 
determined that South Sudan became independent against the backdrop of 
underlying internal grievances that were not subsequently addressed. This, 
coupled with insecurity, bad governance and political tensions within the 
ruling SPLM, culminated in the current civil war. The article concludes that 
the HCSS presents a timely opportunity for accountability. Shortcomings 
have, however, been identified, which prompted recommendations made 
to the government and the AU in relation to the HCSS, including limited 
temporal jurisdiction; exclusion of South Sudanese nationals from the 
staff of the court; lack of clarification on who between the government of 
South Sudan and the AU will have custody of archival records of the HCSS; 
unclear legal relationship between the HCSS and the CTRH; and ambiguity 
on who is responsible for initiating the HCSS’ enabling legislation. 
The study also determined that the ARCSS bestows significant 
responsibilities upon the AU in relation to the HCSS which include 
operationalising the HCSS in consultation with the government; 
determining the location of the HCSS; appointing court personnel; availing 
the necessary infrastructure and funding; providing an enforcement 
mechanism for HCSS decisions; and coordinating stakeholder support. 
The article has made recommendations on how the AU can effectively 
perform these obligations. The study concludes that the AU must take the 
lead in relation to the HCSS in order to guarantee focus and sustainability.
Finally, the article notes that as of the time of writing, Kiir and Machar 
had again fallen out with the latter leaving the country and controversially 
being replaced by Taban Deng Gai as First Vice-President of the transitional 
government. In response, IGAD launched a High Level Revitalisation 
Forum to get the process back on track, resulting in Kiir and Machar 
signing yet another deal in September 2018 for the reinstatement of Machar 
and recommitting to the ARCSS. While these recent developments have 
made the situation more fragile, they have also shown the urgency in 
implementing the ARCSS, particularly the HCSS.
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